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Abstract  
The emergence of megacities raises a number of conceptual questions for political science and 
public administration. It is as yet unclear to what extent the huge size of megacities presents 
conditions that require qualifications or adaptations to existing concepts and theoretical mod-
els for the analysis of governance in megacities as compared to urban regions of lesser size. 
The aim of this paper is to discuss this conceptual issue. With respect to policy problems, dis-
tinctions between megacities and smaller cities seem to be a matter of degree rather than qual-
ity. With respect to governability, however, megacities seem to present particular problems: 
institutional complexity, a weakness of public resources and, linked to this, an actor system 
where private businesses and the informal sector plays a more important role, as well as a 
strong entwinement between local and national governments. Only the new regionalist ap-
proach rests on theoretical premises that can, realistically, seen to be met in megacities. Ana-
lysing megacity governance on the basis of the new regionalist approach means to focus our 
attention on four elements that facilitate coordination by negotiation: (a) actors’ attitudes to-
wards sustained negotiation as the core means of policy-coordination, (b) the emergence of 
consensus as a mode of interaction, (c) the construction of political leadership at the scale of 
the megacity, (d) the use of slack in the multi-levelled relationships by policy-relevant actors. 
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1. Introduction1 
The twin forces of globalization and urbanization have changed the face of the world. The 
year 2008 has even marked a turning point in the history of mankind. For the first time ever, 
the number of humans living in cities exceeded those living in rural areas. All over the planet, 
the urbanization process has accelerated and cities have grown. In parallel, the spatial form of 
cities has changed profoundly. The city in the classic sense of a territorially integrated socio-
economic entity has ceased to exist. Global competition for the location of businesses and in-
vestments has fostered the emergence of metropolitan areas, i.e. large areas of suburban set-
tlement that have sprawled far over the boundaries of traditional cities. These metropolitan ar-
eas will be the context of social, economic and political life for a growing majority of the 
world’s citizens in the 21st century (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers, 2005).  
Some of these urban regions have grown to a considerable size. In the world today, there are 
23 urban regions with a population that exceeds 10 million (United Nations, 2012). They are 
often described as megacities. This term conveys the notion that these very large urban re-
gions have specificities that are due to their sheer size. In this respect, megacities are distinct 
from global cities, which are defined by their position in the upper ranks of a global order of 
urban centrality (Sassen, 2001). Megacities can be global cities at the same time - such as To-
kyo or New York - but most of them are, in fact, provincial cities from the global point of 
view (Sassen, 2011). This idea to define a specific form of urban human settlement mainly 
according to very large population size can be traced back to antiquity (Hall, 1997), where the 
Greeks conceived of the ‘megapolis’ as spaces that, due to large population size, were the site 
of particularly intensive political, social and economic activities. The understanding of ‘mega’ 
is, of course, always relative to the population growth and pattern of a given historic periods. 
The world’s contemporary megacities are, in this respect, without precedents. Never in his-
tory have cities been so large (Lorrain, 2010: 16 ff.). In Europe, the population of antique 
Rome or Byzantium peaked at 1 million. The cities of Mesopotamia and ancient China had 
not more than half a million inhabitants. Teotihuacan, the largest city of the pre-columbian era 
in the Americas, counted a quarter of a million at its heydays. The important cities of middle 
age Europe cities were even smaller than that: Florence or Venice had only little more than 
100’000 inhabitants. Megacities exceeding 10 millions inhabitants are a recent phenomenon. 
                                                 
1
 The author gratefully acknowledges research assistance by Su Yun Woo, as well as valuable inputs 
from Christian Lefèvre in the preparation of this paper. 
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They emerged after World War II, when Tokyo, and then New York, exceeded this mark for 
the first time.  
Speaking of megacities implies that mainly the huge size, but also the relative recency of 
these forms of human settlements carry specificities that must be acknowledged and that are 
worth studying as such. For political scientists interested in issues of governance in the urban 
context, this contention raises a number of conceptual questions. Indeed, the governance of 
cities and urban regions is a classic topic of political science and public administration, and 
has been extensively studied. It is as yet unclear to what extent the huge size of megacities 
leads to conditions that require qualifications or adaptations to existing concepts and theoreti-
cal models when assessing issues of governance in megacities as compared to urban regions 
of lesser size. An additional conceptual challenge results from the fact that most of the exist-
ing scientific literature on the topic of urban and metropolitan governance is based on experi-
ences in OECD countries, while the bulk of the World’s contemporary megacities are located 
outside of this context. Hence, it is unclear to what extent the theoretical frameworks and the 
analytical tools developed so far to understand, explain and address problems of urban and 
metropolitan governance are also applicable to contexts outside of the Western, industrialised 
countries.  
The aim of this paper is to discuss this conceptual issue. We will do so in three steps. Section 
2 defines the term of megacities and identifies the specificity of policy problems in the 
megacity context. Section 3 discusses the governability of megacities and aims to single out 
the factors that make the governing of megacities particularly difficult. Finally, section 4 dis-
cusses existing theoretical models to understand and analyse governance of metropolitan ar-
eas in the light of the specificities of mega-cities. The conclusion wraps up the main points of 
this discussion and identifies the core elements of a research agenda on governance issues in 
megacities.  
 
2. Policy problems in megacities 
The emergence of megacities has fascinated numerous observers from politics, media and the 
arts. Megacities have sparked pessimistic accounts of the future of humanity, such as US his-
torian Mike Davis’s (2006) book Planet of slums, emphasizing the drawbacks of wild urban 
growth in developing countries. But there are also more optimistic narratives, such as the re-
cent book Arrival city by Canadian journalist Doug Saunders (2011), who points out the op-
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portunities and chances that megacities provide for economic growth, human development 
and political modernization. In parallel, megacities have increasingly become an object of sci-
entific scrutiny. A keyword search in the Web of Science yields 677 entries (in September 
2012). Most of this work on megacities has been published since 1996, i.e. in the last 15 years 
and especially towards the end of this period. In terms of disciplines, these publications origi-
nate mainly in the environmental (234 entries) or atmospheric sciences (231), followed by en-
gineering (72), geography (67) and urban studies (56). However, only few publications deal 
with questions of governance or politics in megacities in a perspective of public administra-
tion or political science. This section aims to clarify the starting point for the development of 
such a perspective, i.e. distinguish the characteristic features of megacities and lay out the 
specific challenges to their governance. 
2.1 Defining megacities: characteristics and distinctions 
To define megacities in a comprehensive and analytically meaningful way has proven to be an 
elusive endeavour. The primary criterion for determining what makes a city a megacity is 
clearly population size: most researchers define megacities as large urban agglomerations de-
lineated in the World Urbanization Prospects (United Nations, 2012) that exceed a population 
threshold of 10 million. Such defined, there were 23 megacities in the year 2010, and current 
projections estimate this number to rise to 30 by the year 2025 (Table 1). The bulk of the con-
temporary megacities are located in developing countries or emerging markets, where mega-
cities are also forecasted to accelerate their growth. For example, Lagos megacity is projected 
to expand by 74%, adding more than 8 million people (to nearly 19 million total) between 
2010 and 2025. Over the same time period, Dhaka is estimated to grow by 53% (plus 8 mil-
lion to 23 million total), Karachi by 50% (plus 6.5 million to 20 million total), Jakarta by 31% 
(plus 3 million to nearly 13 million total), and Kolkata also by 31% (plus 4.5 million to nearly 
19 million). Looking at particular countries, China and India stand out. Four out of the 23 
megacities worldwide in 2010 were located in China, three in India. By 2025, China is pro-
jected to count six out of 30 megacities, India five.  
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Table 1: Urban agglomerations over 10 million in 2010 and 2025 (projection) 
Megacity  Country Population 2010 
(in millions) 
Population 2025 (projec-
tion in millions) 
Tokyo Japan 36.93 38.66 
Delhi India 21.94 32.94 
Mexiko-City Mexico 20.14 24.58 
New York USA 20.10 23.57 
São Paulo Brasil 19.65 23.17 
Shanghai China 19.55 28.40 
Mumbai India 19.42 26.56 
Beijing China 15.00 22.63 
Dhaka Bangladesh 14.93 22.91 
Kolkata India 14.28 18.71 
Karachi Pakistan 13.50 20.19 
Buenos Aires Argentina 13.37 15.52 
Los Angeles USA 13.22 15.69 
Rio de Janeiro Brasil 11.87 13.62 
Manila Philippines 11.65 16.28 
Moscow Russia 11.47 12.58 
Osaka Japan 11.43 12.03 
Cairo Egypt 11.03 14.74 
Istanbul Turkey 10.95 14.90 
Lagos Nigeria 10.79 18.86 
Paris Frankreich 10.52 12.16 
Guangzhou China 10.49 15.47 
Shenzhen China 10.22 15.54 
Kinshasa DOC 8.41 14.54 
Chongqing China 9.98 13.63 
Bangalore India 8.25 13.19 
Jakarta Indonesa 9.77 12.82 
Chennai India 8.78 12.81 
Wuhan China 9.16 12.73 
Tianjin China 8.53 11.93 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2012) 
World Urbanization Prospects: the 2011 Revision, CD-Rom Edition 
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The UN figures draw on national statistical definitions and are therefore based on criteria that 
may differ from one country to another. Nevertheless, they all define urban areas on the basis 
of functional criteria (e.g. commuter patterns or contiguity of the built-up area) rather than in-
stitutional boundaries. Conceptually thus, megacities are defined as very large spatial ag-
glomeration of socio-economic functions and networks. In many instances, their coming 
about is due to population growth boosted by improved territorial connectivity within but also 
across smaller cities or metropolitan areas. A megacity therefore appears as a “sufficient, in-
ternally diverse, economic territory that can contain diverse spatial logics - particularly, ag-
glomeration and dispersal logics - which might translate into high-cost high density areas and 
low-cost low density areas” (Sassen, 2011: 103). Beyond mere population size, it is para-
mount to uncover the complexities that are embedded in the megacity as territories of eco-
nomic production and social reproduction.  
2.2 The specificities of policy problems in megacities 
A political science perspective on the governance of megacities entails to focus on the role of 
public policies in these territories. We can define a public policy as an action programme 
formulated and implemented by state authorities in order to act on a situation that is publicly 
considered as problematic (‘policy problem’). As we know, there are a number of policy 
problems that occur in any given urban context. Five problem areas can be distinguished:  
• the regulation of property rights in order to steer spatial development (who can own 
land to be purchased, built-up, developed or sold);  
• the provision of technical infrastructure that allows the spatial agglomeration proc-
esses that are at the heart of urban growth (most importantly roads, transportation and 
energy);  
• the provision of public utilities and services important to social reproduction processes 
(notably water, education, sanitation, health);  
• the limitation of environmental degradation following from urban growth and eco-
nomic activity (e.g. pollution, waste disposal);  
• the setting up of mechanisms of redistribution in order to limit poverty, segregation 
and conflict.  
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Hence, urban public governance capacity means the ability to coordinate the multiplicity of 
actors who are relevant to acting effectively on these policy problems. The context of megaci-
ties - i.e. the very large size - does entail specificities in this respect. Indeed, megacities are 
not only extremely large, they have also grown at an amazingly high pace, and most of them 
will continue to grow at a very high rate in the near future (Table 1). Hence, policy problems 
in megacities are characterized by challenges resulting from high rates of growth. These chal-
lenges relate to all four areas of policy problems identified above: the magnitude of these pol-
icy problems is likely to be significantly higher in megacities than elsewhere.  
3. The governability of megacities 
Megacities are therefore characterised by the pressing nature and the magnitude of policy 
problems as a consequence of rapid growth. But the ability to formulate and implement public 
policies that can effectively address these public problems not only depends on the character-
istics of these public problems. The ability of state authorities to effectively address public 
problems and steer economic and social development also depends on their ability to coordi-
nate policy relevant actors in a meaningful way. This raises the question of governability of 
megacities. The notion of governability focuses on the state of being governed, i.e. the ability 
to produce collective action in order to address problems and challenges facing society and to 
steer its economic and social development in a certain way. Defined as “the capacity to solve 
urgent societal problems” (van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004: 156), the notion of gov-
ernability focuses the analysis towards obstacles or difficulties that state authorities typically 
face for policy-making in a given context.2  
3.1 Institutions, resources, power balance and the role of the national state 
Hence, asking the governability question means to ask whether there is anything specific to 
megacities that makes them difficult to govern. There are a number of candidates that can be 
discussed. 
Looking at state institutions, first of all, megacities are characterized by extreme governmen-
tal fragmentation. Back in the 1960s Robert Wood’s famous quip about the 1400 governments 
of New York (Wood, 1961) pointed out the hyper-fragmented nature of the New York 
megacity’s institutional landscape. Urban growth in the 20th century across the world has 
taken place mainly by sprawl and spatial expansion across institutional boundaries 
                                                 
2
  E.g. the famous 1975 report by Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington and Joji Watanuki on the Govern-
ability of Democracies, pointing out a range of factors that make modern democracies ungovernable.  
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(Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers, 2005). Even when they have not failed, institutional reforms 
lagged far behind the pace of spatial development. As a result, urban regions across the world 
today encompass a large number of local jurisdictions - the larger they are, the higher this 
number. In megacities, the degree of institutional fragmentation can therefore be assumed to 
be particularly high. This is significant to their governability: the higher the number of gov-
ernmental actors, the higher coordination costs.  
Second, there is the question of resources that state authorities can mobilise. Megacitites in-
deed face peculiar problems resulting from economic (under)development. With respect to 
their situation in the global economic order, most of the world’s contemporary 23 megacities 
are laggards, not (yet) winners (Sassen, 2011: 101). It is a common misperception that mega-
cities have been driving global economic growth. While many megacities have been the focus 
of socio economic agglomeration processes, they are not necessarily powerhouses of eco-
nomic growth. In most megacities, the growth rate of the urban economy has not exceeded the 
growth rate of the wider national host economy and this situation is expected to last. It is es-
timated that, until 2025, today's 23 megacities will contribute only about 10 percent of global 
economic growth, which is well below their 14 percent share of global GDP.3 This means that 
most megacities - very much in contrast to global cities - will face increasing difficulties to 
self-generate the financial resources needed to hire qualified staff, and to finance the provi-
sion of infrastructures, utilities and services needed to effectively address their policy prob-
lems. Nevertheless, the problem of scarcity of public revenue can be assumed to affect not all 
megacities equally, but mostly those located in a context of economic weakness and/or under-
development.  
Third, and linked to the former, the constellation and power balance of policy relevant actors 
in megacities can assumed to be distinct from that in urban regions of lesser size. In particu-
lar, the weakness of state authorities in terms of financial resources reduces their capacity or 
willingness to constrain private business actors who, wielded with the “systemic power” 
(Stone, 1993) of control over capital investment, have a considerable impact in forming and 
shaping urban development. In megacities, the private sector is therefore deemed to play a 
more important role in policy-making than elsewhere. In addition, especially in the megacities 
of the Global South the importance of the informal sector must be emphasized. Wild and un-
planned urbanization via invasions of vacant land has been a recurring feature of urban devel-
opment in many developing countries (Stren, 2012: 578 ff.), and thereby a central vector of 
                                                 
3
  http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/urban_world/index.asp 
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the formation and growth of megacities. These invaded territories tend to urbanise more or 
less independently from state intervention, relying strongly on community self-organisation. 
Neighbourhood committees play a crucial role in these areas: they function as gate-keepers 
who control the access to the neighbourhood; they regulate housing development when in-
habitants transform shacks into more decent dwellings; they help organise the provision of 
basic public utilities such as electricity and water (often pinched off the public networks); 
they work towards the provision of educational and health services to the population in need; 
and they might play a role in permitting or regulating (informal) economic activities. Megaci-
ties, more than cities of lesser size, can therefore be assumed to comprise large territories 
which escape the regulation by an instituted political power. Informal sectors of economic 
production and social reproduction can hence be assumed to play crucial roles in megacity 
governability.  
Finally, megacities challenge national territorial equilibria. The larger they become, the more 
weight they gain in national systems of economic production and social reproduction. Coun-
tries with megacities will increasingly see their fate linked to that of their megacities, respec-
tively the relations they establish among each other and with the rest of the countries. The 
governance of megacities thereby becomes a matter of national and importance. Critical geog-
raphers such as Neil Brenner (1999, , 2004) have argued that the metropolitan region increas-
ingly becomes the relevant territorial scale of globalised capitalism, and that state institutions 
in developed economies tend to reconstitute around this scale. Mutatis mutandis, similar ten-
dencies can be assumed for megacities in less developed countries: given their rising impor-
tance in terms of population and economic production, policy-making in megacities will im-
ply a (conflictual) reconstituting of the relations between urban authorities and higher state 
levels. To run a country means to run its megacities. We can therefore assume that the in-
volvement of national agencies and authorities in urban policy-making is stronger in megaci-
ties than what is the case in cities of lesser size. This does not necessarily make policy-
making easier. Although the involvement of national agencies most likely also improves the 
resource situation, conflicts of autonomy and decision-making authority can have constrain-
ing effects. In any case, the role of the national state can be assumed to be a crucial factor of 
governability in megacities. 
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4. The governance of megacities: a case for the “new regionalism” 
Most observers agree that the establishment of governance capacity on a region-wide basis as 
crucial to enhance a city’s competitiveness in an increasingly globalised economy (Savitch 
and Kantor, 2002). But the question of how exactly this should be achieved has triggered a 
long running scientific and political debate about the ‘best way’ to overcome disparities be-
tween functionally integrated metropolitan areas on the one hand, and the fragmentation of in-
stitutional territories on the other hand.  
4.1 Governing city regions: the long running debate4 
The formulation and implementation of policies to address policy problems in metropolitan 
areas  require the arbitration between a whole array of conflicting territorial and sectoral in-
terests, and need to overcome problems of co-ordination between a multitude of different po-
litical and administrative entities. But metropolitan areas across the world are characterised by 
„geopolitical fragmentation“ (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers, 2005), that poses difficulties to 
addressing policy problems and providing services on an area-wide basis. While there is a ba-
sic consensus about the issue of governability of institutionally fragmented metropolitan ar-
eas, there is substantial disagreement over possible responses. As David Lowery (1999) has 
argued, this disagreement has sparked one of the longest debates in social science. Running 
since the early 20th century, this debate has coined three intellectual traditions (for an over-
view see Savitch and Vogel, 2009, Kübler and Pagano, 2012).  
First, the so-called metropolitan reform tradition views the existence of a large number of in-
dependent jurisdictions as the main obstacle to efficient and equitable governance of metro-
politan areas. Inspired by the logic of economies of scale, metropolitan reformers have advo-
cated governmental consolidation, whereby institutional boundaries would be brought to 
match the scale of the functional metropolitan territory. Such consolidation can be achieved, it 
is argued, through the annexation of suburbs by core-cities, city-county consolidation (in the 
American context), or by the creation of metropolitan governments, i.e., two-tier institutions 
with extensive competencies and autonomy. Metropolitan reformers claim that a more cen-
tralised and integrated governing system would reduce social segregation within metropolitan 
areas, allow to address the spatial mismatch of expenditure needs and fiscal capacities, as well 
as ensure the supply of metropolitan-wide policies designed to enhance equity and promote 
economic growth (Lowery, 2000). Drawing on these arguments, institutional reforms have 
                                                 
4
  This section draws on the presentation in Kübler (2012b, , 2012a).  
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been initiated in metropolitan areas throughout the world. Yet, political factors (e.g., fear of a 
loss of control by higher or lower government levels) as well as place identity often fuelled 
strong resistance against such reforms, resulting in a “long series of disappointing experi-
ments” (Lefèvre, 1998: 13)..  
Second, the public choice perspective emerged in the late 1950s, mainly as a coherent critique 
of the thence dominant metropolitan reform tradition. The public choice perspective on met-
ropolitan governance argues that “a multi-jurisdictional metropolitan area can be better under-
stood as a complex local public economy than as a maze, a jungle, a crazy quilt, a stew or 
other metaphor indicating the absence of rational organization” (Parks and Oakerson, 1989: 
19). On the one hand, public choice scholars draw on Tiebout’s (1956) classic idea of people 
'voting with their feet', to argue that the competition between autonomous local constituencies 
will lead to effective matching of service demands and foster efficiency in the allocation of 
public services. In order to attract residents and businesses, localities will keep taxes low, 
provide good services and be responsive to citizens. On the other hand, the public choice 
school emphasises the principle of self-governance as localities have strong incentives to ad-
just relationships and settle conflicts between them (Ostrom et al., 1961). As localities seek 
efficiency in their providing of public goods, they will engage in schemes of voluntary coop-
eration in order to realise scale economies (Ostrom, 1983). Area-wide coordination, it is ar-
gued, will therefore emerge by itself. The prescriptive implications of the public choice per-
spective are straightforward: it makes a strong case for institutional fragmentation - rather 
than consolidation - as well as for self-governance by autonomous localities - rather than cen-
tralised government. Prominent criticisms of the public choice perspective have tended to 
emphasise inadequacies of the Tiebout model of residential choice and the lack of equity this 
model produces. More particularly, the idea of individual choice of housing is criticised as “a 
rather heroic assumption under the conditions of chronic housing shortage” (Kriesi, 2005: 
251) especially at the lower end of the market. Recent research in the public choice tradition 
therefore tends to put less emphasis on residential mobility. For instance, some scholars sug-
gest a distinction between public service provision (i.e., decisions about which goods and ser-
vices to provide by public means) and production (i.e., transforming input resources to render 
a service) (Parks and Oakerson, 2000) and emphasise that competition takes place both 
among provision units (i.e., municipalities) and among production units (i.e., service contrac-
tors), the latter being independent from citizens’ residential choices.  
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Consolidation or fragmentation? Centralised government or self-governance by autonomous 
localities? Since the 1950s, the dispute between the metropolitan reform school and the public 
choice perspective has sparked a myriad of studies aiming to demonstrate the superiority of 
each approach. If anything, the empirical evidence is inconclusive (Keating, 1995). What the 
empirical analysis tends to show, is that the majority of public problems that arise in metro-
politan areas end up being mediated through coordination and cooperation in formal or infor-
mal networks in which local governments, public agencies from various other levels of gov-
ernment, private actors, but also civil society organisations, are involved. A third perspective 
has therefore emerged, focusing on the role of such policy networks in metropolitan govern-
ance and has discovered a new regionalism (Wallis, 1994, Savitch and Vogel, 2000, , 2009, 
Brenner, 2002). This third approach is based on the argument that governance - in the sense of 
coordinating actors to produce public policies - cannot only result from hierarchic decision 
making (metropolitan reform tradition) or competition (public choice tradition), but also via 
negotiation. It thereby echoes the work on multi-level governance in Europe (e.g. Hooghe and 
Marks, 2003) emphasising the importance of voluntary cooperation and joint-decision sys-
tems as a means to coordinate policy-making across state levels in a context of increasing in-
terdependencies. The new regionalism approach conveys a more relaxed view on the design 
of territorial institutions. Routes towards new regionalism are thought to be diverse (Savitch 
and Vogel, 2000): they may include institutional consolidation, but voluntary cooperation 
among autonomous localities is considered a functional equivalent, as long as it successfully 
associates relevant actors with the production of policies that enhance international competi-
tiveness.  
It is important to note how the scope of this debate has changed over the years. At the onset of 
the debate, metropolitan areas were seen as self-sufficient systems. Metropolitan reformers 
and public choice scholars have mainly been concerned with questions of efficiency, effec-
tiveness and equity. For them, capacity of governance in metropolitan areas essentially was 
about effective area-wide planning, efficient public services, as well as equitable distribution 
of wealth within single metropolitan areas. New regionalists portend a different view. They 
stress the context of economic globalisation as the frame through which issues of metropoli-
tan governance must be read. Metropolitan economies, they contend, compete against each 
other at a global scale, and the essence of metropolitan governance is to provide the critical 
local assets in order to ensure, maintain and improve competitiveness. Metropolitan areas, 
new regionalists argue, are not isolated and self-sufficient territorial systems, but they are part 
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of a global order of centrality that is relevant for governance as it creates opportunities for lo-
cal actors but also imposes restrictions upon them. Some authors in the strand of new region-
alism (e.g. Brenner, 2004) have recently argued that metropolitan governance capacity is a 
major issue of globalised capitalism. The pressures of globalisation not only result in a reor-
ganisation of governance in a given metropolitan area, but also have implications for the state 
more generally, as its institutions are increasingly reconstituted at the metropolitan scale. The 
issue of metropolitan governance has therefore gained a new scope. It is no longer a question 
of local interest limited to single metropolitan areas, but relates to changes and developments 
in the organisation of the wider state apparatus. This involves not only the reorganisation of 
vertical relationships between urban governments and higher state levels, but also the changed 
relationship between public and private actors. Metropolitan governance is a topic that in-
creasingly concerns state agencies at the regional, national and even the supra-national level 
(e.g., the European Union), but also business and civil society actors with vested interests in 
the global competitiveness of metropolitan economies. 
4.2 A governance model for megacities: four crucial factors of governance 
How do these three governance models fare in the light of the issues of governability previ-
ously identified and specific to megacities? Following Dominique Lorrain (2010), we argue 
that megacities defy the two classic models of metropolitan governance.  
On the one hand, pursuing the metropolitan reform model in a megacity context seems to be a 
rather hopeless endeavour. Institutionally speaking, megacities are characterised by a very 
high degree of institutional fragmentation. Consolidationist territorial reforms are therefore 
inherently difficult to realise and will most likely be only partially successful. Looking at the 
constellation of policy relevant actors in megacities, the importance of the private and infor-
mal sectors, as well as the involvement of higher level authorities limit the possibilities of top-
down decision-making, considerably thus hampering the effectiveness of coordination 
through hierarchical steering.  
On the other hand, megacities present peculiarities that preclude territorial competition as an 
effective mode of coordination. Megacity territories are concomitantly formed by agglomera-
tion and dispersion logics, resulting in functional specialisation of space, economic disparities 
and social segregation. Social and economic heterogeneity is more pronounced in megacities 
than in urban regions of a lesser size. This situation distorts the competition among localities. 
In megacities it seems particularly likely that “fragmentation of big city government enables 
the rich to lock up their money and resources in the wealthy suburbs, leaving the rest to man-
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age as best they can with their smaller tax bases and greater demands on public services” 
(Newton, 2012: 415).  
In the metropolitan reform model, the underlying philosophy of governance is hierarchy. The 
public choice model assumes that self-coordination among localities will emerge through the 
invisible hand of self-interested competition. But the preconditions for both these models to 
function properly are unlikely to be met in a megacity context. Megacities are characterised 
by institutional complexity, the weakness of public authorities compared to private business 
or actors from the informal sectors, as well as a multi-levelled actor system where urban au-
thorities and national government agencies are strongly entwined. In such a context, only the 
third model of metropolitan governance - new regionalism as it is called - rests on premises 
that seem realistic. Following Dahl and Lindblom (1992) we argue that the underlying phi-
losophy of governance portended by the new regionalist approach is that of “bargaining”. 
New regionalism focuses on the emergence of area-wide governance capacity through proc-
esses of negotiation between policy relevant actors. The status of these actors with respect to 
formal hierarchies or their sector (public/private/societal) is of secondary importance. Accord-
ing to the new regionalist approach, the crucial act of governance consists in bringing the 
relevant actors to agree on the usefulness of a collective endeavour.  
However, negotiation as a mode of coordination also has its limits. As Fritz Scharpf has ar-
gued, the greatest obstacle to negotiated coordination is what he calls the “joint decision trap” 
(Scharpf, 1988). The joint decision trap clicks shut when, in a negotiation process, defenders 
of the status quo block all changes due to a de facto unanimity rule that results from the ab-
sence of hierarchy between interdependent negotiators. Negotiation systems are successful in 
producing coordination to the extent that they are able to avoid the joint decision trap. Four 
factors appear to be crucial in this respect.  
The first factor relates to actor behaviour. Positive attitudes towards the negotiation process 
and cooperative behaviour within the process are a requirement for smooth negotiation (Benz, 
2001). Stakeholders in the negotiation process need to be convinced of the value of its ends. 
They must share the belief that there is something to be gained from improved governance 
capacity and that the negotiation process is a means to eventually achieve such capacity. This 
prevents defective behaviour in the negotiation process. Much more than hierarchy or market, 
coordination through negotiation relies on trust and mutual respect and is helped by conflict-
avoiding strategies (‘pragmatism’): formulating soft norms rather than obligations, consulting 
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all relevant interests, equitable allocation of financial resources, work towards solution that 
only minimally alter the status quo, anticipate resistance, etc.  
The second factor relates to the decision rules. As Scharpf (1997: 144) has argued there is a 
distinction to be made between unanimity and consensus. Unanimity implies decision-making 
as a one-off event where actors decided on the basis of exogenous preferences. In contrast, 
consensus can be defined as a mode of interaction “in which discussion is continued until no 
one still insists on opposing a proposed solution” (Scharpf, 1997: 144) and in which blatant 
obstruction can be delegitmised as narrow self-interest, or excluded from the negotiation alto-
gether. Examples of consensus as a decision rules is often found in committees that formally 
operate under majority rule, but where participants usually prefer to avoid overriding the in-
terests of a minority. The reason for this, according to Scharpf, lies in the “norms of reciproc-
ity based on the expectation that everyone will be in the minority position at one time or an-
other” (Scharpf, 1997: 144). In order for consensus to come about as an operational decision 
rule, the continuity of negotiation processes is important. Only under sustained negotiation 
can norms of reciprocity emerge and become operational.  
Third, political leadership is important. Strong visions put forward by political leaders can be 
an important motivation for stakeholders to invest time and energy in sustained negotiation 
aiming to achieve governance capacity. Successful leadership (by a single person or a group), 
can foster the emergence of coalitions, stimulate cooperation and factilitate consensus among 
stakeholders, on the basis of a common understanding over the desirable - and desired - de-
velopment path in a given urban region (see Jouve and Lefèvre, 2002).  
Finally, loose coupling of negotiation arenas - rather than too tight relationships between them 
- also facilitates negotiation processes. The concept of loose coupling originates in systems 
theory (see Weick, 2001) and assumes that decisions of different subsystems can never de-
termine decisions in other subsystems completely but can, at best, influence some aspects of 
decision-making in an other subsystem. The concept of loose coupling conceives negotiation 
processes with different decision arenas - e.g. in multi-level governance structures - not as 
connected games, but as embedded games. Any attempt to tighten the coupling between these 
arenas therefore reduces negotiators’ leeway and thereby the number of possible decisions. 
Working on regional policy in the European Union, Benz and Eberlein (1999) have shown 
how the loose coupling of decision arenas has in fact increased options and reduced the risk of 
joint decision traps. Basically, loose coupling conveys the notion that any social organisation 
needs some slack built into it in order to function properly. Organisational slack will be crea-
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tively used by actors, which, in turn, increases the options in the decision-making process 
when searching solutions to organisational problems.  
To sum up, effective megacity governance seems to rest on positive attitudes towards sus-
tained negotiation as the main process of collective action, strong political leadership, as well 
as some degree of slack within the system of multi-level governance.  
5. Conclusion: towards a research agenda on mega-city governance 
This paper set out to discuss the usefulness of existing concepts and analytical approaches for 
the understanding and explaining governance issues in megacities in a political science per-
spective. Are megacities, in comparison to metropolitan areas of a lesser size, different in 
terms of policy problems and governability? With respect to policy problems, distinctions be-
tween megacities and smaller cities seem to be a matter of degree rather than quality. Megaci-
ties and smaller cities face similar policy challenges and in the same fields. It is simply the 
magnitude of these problems that is likely to be higher in megacities than in metropolitan ar-
eas of lesser size. With respect to governability, however, megacities can be assumed to pre-
sent particular problems: institutional complexity, a weakness of public resources and, linked 
to this, an actor system where private businesses and the informal sector plays a more impor-
tant role, as well as a strong entwinement between local and national governments.  
The context of megacities, we have argued, therefore defies the two traditional schools of 
thought on metropolitan governance. Neither the metropolitan reform model of hierarchical 
direction, nor the public choice tenet of unfettered competition between autonomous localities 
can provide analytical guidance for understanding the governance conundrum in megacities. 
Only the new regionalist approach starts on theoretical premises that can, realistically, seen to 
be met in megacities. Analysing megacity governance on the basis of the new regionalist ap-
proach means to focus our attention on elements that facilitate coordination by negotiation. 
More precisely, we need to analyse and understand 
• why and how actors develop positive attitudes towards sustained negotiation as a core 
means of policy-coordination; 
• how and why consensus emerges as a mode of interaction within these negotiation 
processes, i.e. minority actors are not overruled unless they are seen to blatantly ob-
struct negotiations by pursuing narrow self interests; 
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• how, by whom and on the basis of what type of resources political leadership is con-
structed and sustained in megacities; 
• how and why slack is built into the structuring of the relationship between policy-
relevant actors, how this slack is used by policy-relevant actors, as well as how this 
contributes to overall decision-making capacity.  
However, there is one aspect that the above discussion has failed to address, an aspect that 
pertains to the conditions that are found in megacities outside of the OECD context. It is less 
the state of economic development that is important here and that induces governance prob-
lems due the scarcity of public resources and the weakness of the public sector. More impor-
tantly, it is the wider regime context of the countries in which many of the World’s megacities 
are located today. Indeed, the relationship between the state and society, the nature and work-
ings of political institutions and authorities can be assumed to be fundamentally different be-
tween liberal democracies on the one hand, and semi-democracies or authoritarian regimes on 
the other hand. We have argued that megacities are inherently characterised by institutional 
complexity and pluralism of actors. However, it is unclear whether and how the contexts of 
non-democratic regimes affects the dynamics of negotiation between the policy-relevant ac-
tors in a particular way. Among the four elements of megacity governance identified above, it 
is particularly the third one - i.e. the construction of political leadership - that is likely to be 
affected by the wider regime context. In democracies, the construction of political leadership 
can be assumed to rest upon different mechanisms and resources than in non-democracies. In 
this respect, the comparative analysis of megacity governance will have to pay particular at-
tention to the wider regime context.  
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